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II.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Introduction
Gregory Higgins was convicted of first degree murder. He was sentenced to

fixed life. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment and sentence. State v.

Higgins, No. 41572, 2014 Ida. App. Unpub. LEXIS 426 (Ct. App. 2014). This is an
appeal from the summary disposition of his Amended Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief. Limited Clerk’s Record (“LCR”) 458.
B.

Post-Conviction Proceedings
Mr. Higgins filed a pro se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. He later filed

an amended petition, which alleged his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to
object to a DVD of a police interview where the police officer comments that Mr.
Higgins had previously asserted his right to remain silent, and for failing to move
for a mistrial after the exhibit had been published to the jury. (Trial Exhibit 5.)
LCR 49-50, 62.
The court took judicial notice of the criminal case jury trial transcripts and
jury instruction #11. LCR 79. It also informally took judicial notice of the contents
of Exhibit 5, which it described as follows:
Exhibit 5 was a DVD containing footage of an interview with Petitioner
during which Petitioner invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.
A review of the portion of the trial transcript attached to the Petition reflects
that Exhibit 5 was published to the jury and did contain an invocation
Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment rights.
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LCR 72; see also LCR 248 (Criminal Trial Transcripts, pg. 641, ln. 23 – pg. 642, ln.
5).
The court gave Notice of Intent to Dismiss. It presumed for the purposes of
the notice that Mr. Higgins has shown that deficient performance under Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984), had been established. It wrote,
A reference at trial, such as the one in this case, to a defendant’s invocation of
a constitutional right may deprive an accused his or her right to due process
and a fair trial. Under such circumstance, again for purposes this Notice, the
Court finds that the failure to review an exhibit that results in the admission
an exhibit referencing Petitioner’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights,
falls below an objective standard reasonableness and is therefore deficient
performance.
LCR 72-73 (internal citation omitted).
The court then stated that it intended to dismiss due to the absence of an
allegation of prejudice and/or sufficient facts to show a “reasonable likelihood that
the outcome of his trial would have been different.” LCR 73.
Mr. Higgins responded that the error here was fundamental and thus
structural error, which did not require a showing of prejudice under Strickland v.

Washington. LCR 433-434.
The court rejected Mr. Higgins’ structural error argument holding that all

Strickland claims must establish that but for the deficient performance there is a
reasonable probability of a different result. LCR 455-456. It then dismissed the
case holding that Mr. Higgins has not shown that he was prejudiced by the
reference to his invocation of his right to remain silent. LCR 456.
2

A Notice of Appeal was filed. LCR 458. Subsequently, a Final Judgment was
entered. LCR 470.
III.
1.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Does the prejudice prong of Strickland always require a showing of a

reasonable probability of a different result, even when the deficient performance
rendered the proceedings fundamentally unfair?
2.

If such a showing is required in this case, was it made?
IV.

ARGUMENT

The District Court Erred in Dismissing the Amended Petition Because There was a
Showing of Strickland Prejudice.
1.

Strickland prejudice

The prejudice showing is in most cases a necessary part of a Strickland claim.
“That said the concept of prejudice is defined in different ways depending on the
context in which it appears. In the ordinary Strickland case, prejudice means a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. But the Strickland Court cautioned that the
prejudice inquiry is not meant to be applied in a mechanical fashion. For when a
court is evaluating an ineffective-assistance claim, the ultimate inquiry must
concentrate on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding.” Weaver v.

Massachusetts, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1910-11 (2017) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). The Weaver Court assumed for purposes of the opinion
that under a proper interpretation of Strickland, relief still must be granted if the
3

convicted person shows that attorney errors rendered the trial fundamentally unfair
even if there is no showing of a reasonable probability of a different outcome. Id.
Thus, it appears that the district court was incorrect when it held that Strickland
prejudice always means the existence of a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. There is an exception to that rule for deficient performance which renders
the proceedings fundamentally unfair. Weaver v. Massachusetts, supra.
In this case, however, it may be that the ordinary standard of Strickland
prejudice applies. While the deficient performance in Weaver dealt with a
structural error, the deficient performance here, i.e., permitting the jury to hear a
comment upon a petitioner’s right to remain silent, is an error of the trial type
which is subject to harmless error review. See e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
18 (1967) (applying harmless error analysis to violation of Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609 (1965)); Pickens v. Gibson, 206 F.3d 988, 999 (10th Cir. 2000) (same);

Matire v. Wainwright, 811 F.2d 1430, 1436 (11th Cir. 1987) (applying harmless error
rule to a Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), violation). Thus, such an error would
not fall within the fundamental unfairness form of Strickland prejudice. But even
under the ordinary standard, the court erred in dismissing the Strickland claim.
2.

Why the error was prejudicial

Both the U.S. and Idaho Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the
right not to be compelled to testify against him or herself.
4

The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted this right also to bar the prosecution
from commenting on a defendant's invocation of that right. A prosecutor may
not use evidence of post-arrest, post-Miranda silence for either impeachment
purposes or as substantive evidence of guilt "because of the promise present
in a Miranda warning. If a prosecutor is allowed to introduce evidence of

silence, for any purpose, then the right to remain silent guaranteed in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966),

becomes so diluted as to be rendered worthless. The prosecutor also may not
use any post-custody silence to infer guilt in its case-in-chief. In cases of preMiranda, pre-arrest silence, the prosecutor may not use that evidence solely
for the purpose of implying guilt. The prosecutor may use pre-Miranda
silence, either pre or post-arrest, for impeachment of the defendant.

State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 146-47, 334 P.3d 806, 820-21 (2014) (emphasis
added, internal quotations and citations omitted).
Here, the jury’s exposure to Mr. Higgins’ assertion of his right to remain
silent could have led the jury to convict him. AA defendant=s decision to exercise his
or her right to remain silent, whether before or after arrest and Miranda warnings,
cannot be used for the purpose of inferring guilt.@ State v. Stefani, 142 Idaho 698,
701, 132 P.3d 455, 458 (Ct. App. 2005). The rationale behind that rule is that since

Miranda requires certain warnings, “[s]ilence in the wake of these warnings may be
nothing more than the arrestee's exercise of these Miranda rights. Thus, every postarrest silence is insolubly ambiguous because of what the State is required to advise
the person arrested.” Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-18 (1976) “Moreover, while
it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that silence will
carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who receives the
warnings.” Id.

5

Moreover, the prejudice was not ameliorated by a cautionary instruction.

Compare State v. Johnson, --- Idaho ---, 414 P.3d 234, 244 (2018) (finding no
reversible error after an improper comment on defendant’s right to remain silent
when cautionary instruction which informed the jury, inter alia, it was to disregard
the comment and it to draw no inferences from the stricken comment). Here, trial
counsel did not object to the admission of the evidence and did not request the jury
to be instructed that it was not to consider it.
Absent a cautionary instruction, the jury likely took Mr. Higgins’ assertion of
his Fifth Amendment rights during the police interview as an admission of guilt.1
This was highly prejudicial because the state’s case rested largely upon the
testimony of two accomplices, Christopher Duran and Cruz Flores. LCR 178 -209
(Duran), 330-348 (Flores) (Criminal Trial Transcript, pg. 358 – 482 (Duran), pg. 969
– 1038 (Flores).) There was no physical evidence such as DNA or fingerprints
linking Mr. Higgins to the offense. There was no confession. In fact, the jury was
instructed that it could not find Mr. Higgins guilty based solely upon Duran’s and
Flores’s testimony. R 288 (Criminal Trial Transcript pg. 1131, ln. 6 - pg.1132, ln.
17). In light of the absence of corroborative evidence, the jury likely took Mr.
Higgins’ assertion of his right to remain silent as that corroborative evidence.

While the jury was instructed that it could not draw an inference of guilt from the
fact that Mr. Higgins did not testify at trial, it was not instructed it could not draw
such an inference from his assertion of Fifth Amendment rights in Exhibit 5. R 288
(Criminal Trial Transcript pg. 1130, ln. 22- pg.1131, ln. 5.)
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In light of the above, the post-conviction court erred in dismissing the
ineffective assistance of counsel claim because the deficient performance did
prejudice Mr. Higgins.
V.

CONCLUSION

The post-conviction court erred in dismissing the Ineffective Assistance of
Trial Counsel Claim in the Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. The order
should be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of August, 2018.
/s/ Dennis Benjamin
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Gregory Higgins
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